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Abstract Two interpretations about syllogistic statements are described in this
paper. One is the so-called set-based interpretation, which assumes that quan-
tified statements and syllogisms talk about quantity-relationships between sets.
The other one, the so-called conditional interpretation, assumes that quantified
propositions talk about conditional propositions and how strong are the links be-
tween the antecedent and the consequent. Both interpretations are compared
attending to three different questions (existential import, singular statements
and non-proportional quantifiers) from the point of view of their impact on the
further development of this type of reasoning.
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1 Introduction
A syllogism is defined as a deductive argument based on the chaining of terms
using quantified statements. In its classical version [1], it is composed by
three propositions and a single conclusions is necessarily inferred from two
premises. The statements are assertions with the form Q S are P, where Q is
one of the four classical logic quantifiers (“all”, “no”, “some” and “some...not”),
S is the subject-term and P is the predicate-term. All syllogisms involve three
terms: the so-called extremes (Minor and Major terms) constitute the conclu-
sion and also appear in the premises; and the so-called middle term, which
only appears in the premises and links the extreme ones. The position of the
extreme terms in the conclusion is fixed (the minor one is the subject-term
and the major one is the predicate one) but in the premises their position can
vary, as well as the one of the middle term. Like this, the four Aristotelian fig-
ures [1] are generated, that are the four different classical syllogistic inference
patterns.
Perhaps, the most famous example of syllogism is the one shown in Table 1,
where from the links between the terms human (beings) and mortal beings and
between Greeks and human beings, the link between Greeks and mortal (beings)
of the conclusion is inferred.
All human beings are mortal
All Greeks are human beings
All Greeks are mortal
Table 1: Aristotelian Syllogism.
Although Aristotelian Syllogistics was substituted by mathematical logic
at the beginning of twentieth century [2], in its second half it was partially
recovered [3]. One of the aims of the resurgence of syllogistic studies was to
improve the expressiveness capability of Aristotle’s Syllogistics. During 1980s
and early 1990s, different models that improve syllogistic reasoning appeared
in the literature. We classify them into two categories: i) proposals that pre-
serve Aristotelian knowledge representation and inference patterns; ii) pro-
posals that explore alternative models for representing quantified statements
and the inference process.
In the models of category i), we can find two different approaches. The first
one, that involves different proposals [4–7], proposes to improve Aristotelian
Syllogistics introducing new quantifiers such as “few”, “most”, “many”, etc.
The core of Aristotelian Syllogistics is the Logic Square of Opposition (LSO)
(see Fig. 1). It is a square diagram where the logical relationships between the
four type of Aristotelian syllogistic statements (corresponding to each one of
the quantifiers) define the inference rules used by Aristotle for proving the va-
lidity of syllogisms. Thus, these new quantifiers are introducing between the
Pereira-Farin˜a: Some Reflections on the Set-based and the Conditional-based Interpretations of Statements in Syllogistic Reasoning. APHSC 2013,
1:1
DOI 10.1007 978-3-642-31715-68 – http://www.aphsc.org/article/10001
age 2 of 16
universal (“all”, “no”) and the existential (“some”, “some...not”) ones preserv-
ing the Aristotle’s inference rules. Some of these approaches use crisp defini-
tion [4–6] for the quantifiers and others, fuzzy ones [7].
A: All S are P E: No S is P
I: Some S is P O: Some S are not P
Contraries
Subcontraries
Su
ba
lte
rn
at
io
ns
Subalternations
Contradictories
Figure 1: Classical LSO.
The second approach of category i) assumes a different treatment for quan-
tification. Fuzzy Syllogistics [8] interprets quantifiers as fuzzy numbers in the
interval [0, 1]. Thus, “almost all” is interpreted as the fuzzy number approxi-
mate 1 (1˜ using the typical fuzzy notation), which can correspond, for instance,
with the fuzzy set [0.95, 0.97, 0.98, 1]; “few”, for instance, with the fuzzy num-
ber no more than 20%; [0, 0.8, 0.12, 0.2]. Interval Syllogistics [9], on the other
hand, interprets quantifiers in terms of intervals and, thus, “almost all” means,
for instance, [0.95, 1] and “few” [0, 0.15]. Interval Syllogistics can be interpreted
as an intermediate step between crisp approaches a fuzzy ones.
In the models of category ii), it is proposed that quantified statements have
a deep logical form which corresponds with a conditional proposition; e.g.,
“all human beings are mortal” means “if x is a human being, then x is mortal”,
where the the antecedent is the subject-term, the consequent is the predicate-
term and the quantifier denotes how strong is the link between them. Thus,
for the quantifier “all” the strength of the link is total while for “some” the link
is very weak. In the literature, we can find different alternatives for modelling
this link; for instance, Probabilistic Syllogistics [10], that uses probability, or
Support Logic Syllogistics [11], that uses Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence.
Both categories, i) and ii), lead us to consider that two different interpre-
tations about quantifies statements [12]:
• Set-based interpretation: They are the models of category i). This in-
terpretation assumes that the syntactical form of the quantified state-
ments is their logical form. The terms that constitute the propositions
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are sets (i.e., collection of elements) and the quantifier denotes a quantity-
relationship between these sets. They are assertions (that can be true or
false) that entails commitment with reality. For instance, “all human be-
ings are mortal” means that the subject-term, the set of human beings, is
a subset of the predicate-set, the set of mortal beings; “no human being
is a Martian” means that the intersection between the set of human be-
ings and Martians is empty. In this interpretation, the cardinality of the
sets has a fundamental role and, therefore, a syllogism can be seen as an
inference attending to the cardinalities between sets.
• Conditional interpretation: They are the models of category ii). This
interpretation assumes that the syntactical form of the statement hides
its genuine logical form: a conditional structure. Thus, the subject-term
is the antecedent, the predicate-term is the consequent and the quan-
tifier denotes how strong is the relationship between them. While set-
based interpretation focuses on true descriptions in terms of sets, con-
ditional one focuses on fix the truth-conditions for verifying the propo-
sition. For instance, the sentence “all human beings are mortal” means
“if something is a human being, then it is mortal with the maximum
strength in the link” or even “if any element of the universe has the prop-
erty of being a human being, then this element has the property of being a
mortal being with the maximum strength in the link”. In this case, syllo-
gisms show an inference schema closer to Modus Ponens, where the truth
of the antecedent allows us to conclude the consequent rather than a cal-
culation of cardinalities between sets.
Both interpretations generate different approaches for dealing with syllo-
gisms which are not always equivalent [11]. Thus, an analysis about the char-
acteristics and presuppositions that each of these interpretations entails is a
relevant task to be addressed for a further development of syllogistic reason-
ing. This is, precisely, the main objective of this paper.
In [10], we can find a first discussion about this question. The probabilistic
approach is defended as the best one as it is supported on experiments from
psychology of reasoning. These show that human beings have a Bayesian ra-
tionality and all those quantifiers that are relevant from the point of view of
reasoning using the conditional interpretation and probabilities for interpret-
ing quantifiers.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of a computational approach, psycho-
logical experiments are not a strong enough proof. In this paper, we propose
a new point of view to stimulate this discussion about which is the best inter-
pretation for improving the current models of syllogistic reasoning and their
implementation.
To achieve the aims explained before this paper is organized in the follow-
ing sections: section 2 describes the main characteristics of set-based inter-
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pretation and some open questions to be considered; section 3 explains the
model of syllogism performed by Probabilistic Syllogistics and its correspond-
ing challenge questions; and, finally, in section 4, the main conclusions of this
paper are exposed.
2 Set-Based Interpretation: Models and Questions
Set-Based interpretation, as we said, assumes that quantified statements and
syllogisms are talking about relationships between sets. Both the knowledge
representation of the propositions and the reasoning process can be repre-
sented through Venn Diagrams [13]. Let us consider again the example of Ta-
ble 1; Figure 2 shows its representation using Venn Diagrams. Each one of the
terms (Greeks, human beings and mortal beings) is a set. Following the stan-
dard notation, the shadow areas denote the empty sets and the white ones
those that have elements. As can be observed, the only white subset of Greeks
is also a subset of mortal beings; i.e., “all Greeks are mortal”.
E
Human Beings
Greeks Mortal 
Beings
Figure 2: Venn Diagrams for the Aristotelian Syllogism of Table 1.
In the literature, we can find several models for syllogistic reasoning that,
assuming set-based interpretation and introducing new quantifiers, are com-
patible with the representation Venn Diagrams. Thus, Intermediate Syllogis-
tics [4, 14] introduces the quantifiers “almost all”, “few”, “most” and “many”
(with the corresponding negations1; i.e, “most...not” and “many...not”) as
subdivisions into the space between the universal “all” and the existential
“some” in the classical LSO (see Figure 1). This allows the authors to gener-
ate a new LSO with six additional categorical statements and 81 new inference
patterns of syllogistic reasoning. Table 2 shows an example.
1The negation of “almost all” is “few”.
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All students are tall
Most young people are students
Most young people are tall
Table 2: Intermediate Syllogism.
Generalized Intermediate Syllogistics [7], developed within the field of fuzzy
logic, uses the so-called trichotomous evaluative linguistic (TEv) expressions [15]
to perform the subdivision between the universal and the existential quanti-
fiers, but using fuzzy definitions instead of crisp ones, as in Intermediate Syl-
logistics. It is worth noting that all their syllogisms are proved as valid in this
fuzzy version [7].
Other proposal is Exceptive Syllogistics [16]. This reinterprets the quanti-
fiers of the LSO in terms of exception ones, which have the form all but num-
ber; e.g., “all human beings are mortal” is reinterpreted as “all but 0 human
beings are mortal”. In general, “all but x S are P”, where x denotes de size of
the exception. This change generates a new perspective about the reasoning
process, adopting an arithmetical character [6]. Nevertheless, this entails to
incorporate new presuppositions for dealing with the cardinality of |S| and the
corresponding subsets. For instance, we shall rewrite the argument of Table 2
in Table 3 using Exceptive Syllogistics approach. To obtain a result, we have to
assume a cardinality for the set of students; e.g. |students| = 100. As result we
obtain “all but 81 young people are tall”, where “all but 81” can be interpreted
as “most”.
All but 0 students are tall
All but 19 young people are students
All but 100− 19 young people are tall
Table 3: Exceptive Syllogism.
This way for modelling syllogisms demands more information or assump-
tions (as the size of S) than Intermediate Syllogistics, but it allows us to in-
crease significantly the number of possible syllogisms to be addressed: the
quantifier of the conclusion is directly calculated instead of determining the
logical validity of each argument, as in the previous models.
Fuzzy Syllogistics [8] takes to its last consequences the arithmetical calcu-
lation of the conclusion of the syllogism and dismisses of the LSO. Thus, the
intermediate regions between the universal and the existential quantifiers are
denoted by fuzzy proportional numbers [17]. For instance, “most students are
tall” means |students∩tall||students| ≥ α, where α is any of the possible fuzzy numbers
for interpreting “most”. The reasoning process is based on the Quantifier Ex-
tension Principle (QEP) [8] and is performed through fuzzy arithmetic. It is
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worth noting that some new inferences schemas are developed, as the exam-
ple shown in Table 4, known as Intersection/product syllogism. The quantifier
of the conclusion is calculated using the fuzzy multiplication ⊗.
Most students are young
Most young students are single
Most⊗Most students are young and single
Table 4: Fuzzy Syllogism.
Interval Syllogistics [9,18,19] follows the main ideas of Fuzzy Syllogistics,
but avoiding the problems of fuzzy arithmetic that appear in reasoning [20].
In this case, each quantifier is associated to an interval or fuzzy set (defined
through the Ker-Sup approach) and the reasoning process is not based on fuzzy
arithmetic but on the maximization of intervals. For instance, “most students
are tall” means |students∩tall||students| = [a, b] for intervals or [a, c, d, b] for fuzzy sets,
where the kernel is KerQ = [c, d] and the support is SupQ = [a, b].
It is worth noting that, although this framework is classified under the set-
based interpretation, it is compatible with a probabilistic approach. In partic-
ular, with the so-called frequentism interpretation of probability, advocated in
19th century by Jon Venn. He proposed that probabilities are identified with
long-run frequencies of events [21] represented using Venn Diagrams. Thus,
the concept of set is preserved as a collection of elements and quantifiers de-
note the frequencies associated to those set of elements; i.e., the main ideas
of set-based interpretation. Like this, the reasoning process does not consist
of a fuzzy arithmetic procedure but an optimization problem or, in probabilis-
tic terms, restrictions propagation: the premises define the constraints to be
satisfied and the conclusion the most favourable and most unfavourable pro-
portions among the terms of the conclusion according to premises. Table 5
shows an example.
[0.3, 0.5] single people are young
[0.7, 0.9] single people are students
[0, 0.5] single people are young and students
Table 5: Interval Syllogism.
2.1 Some Open Questions
There are some questions inherited from classical syllogistics that must be ad-
dressed. Next, we shall analyse three: i) existential import, ii) singular state-
ments and iii) non-proportional statements.
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2.1.1 Existential import
A statement has existential content if it affirms that the terms of the propo-
sition are not empty [22]. In “some” and “some...not” propositions, such as
“some animals are mammals”, this is clear, as their assertion necessarily en-
tails the existence of elements in the involved sets. Nevertheless, in “all” and
“no” statements this question is not so clear. For instance, let us consider the
following example: “all Martians are blond”. It means that every element of
the set Martians is also a member of the set blond people. Today, there are not
evidences of living beings in Mars, therefore, Martians is a empty set. Since
the empty set is subset of any set, this statement is true. Nonetheless, if we
assume this interpretation, the subalternation relationship of the LSO is not
satisfied, since “all S are P” entails “some S are P”, which affirms that S is not
empty. This question is an old debate in philosophy and it comes from the
Middle Ages. It is worth noting that existential import not only arises at uni-
versal statements but also at intermediate ones, such as the ones introduced
by Intermediate Syllogistics (“almost all S are P”, “most S are P”, “many S are
P”, “few S are P”, etc.). We shall analyse some of them:
• almost all: it seems clear that is closer to universal statements that ex-
istential ones, given the proper quantifier.
• most: we can find the following definition most(S, P )⇔ |S ∩ P | > |S −
P | 2 and, as we can see, it does not include existential import. Therefore,
about this question, its behaviour is the same of universal statements.
• many: there is not an unique definition of this quantifier but it is defined
analogously to “most”.
• few: given that it is closer to “some”, we can think that it can be seen
as an addition to “some” preserving the existential import; however, its
definition according to the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers [23] does
not include it.
In conclusion, we can see that the existential import problem takes more
relevance it the expanded versions of the LSO as the new quantifiers are in-
troduced as reductions of the universal statements.
A direct answer to this question is to assume that universal statements
have existential import; i.e., the assertion of “all Martians are blond” entails
that the set Martians is not empty. However, this solution has several objec-
tions:
• It is not compatible with the first order logic definition for universal
statements; i.e, ∀x(MARTIANx→ BLONDx).
2Typical definition for “most” interpreted more than half of the (on finite universes).
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• From the point of view of natural language, human beings do not as-
sume existential import in any case and, therefore, this cannot directly
incorporated to the meaning of the quantifiers [2].
Other solution is to modify the LSO to obtain a new version without using
subalternation property. This entails to use as core of the LSO the negation
properties instead of the implication ones. Figure 3) shows the version of the
LSO proposed by Peters and Westerstha˚lt [24]. As we can see, the subalter-
nation property is not included in the schema and the negation relationships
play the main role.
All S are P No S is P
Some S is P Not all S are P
Inner Negation
Inner Negation
Dual DualOuter Negation
Figure 3: Modern version of the LSO without existential import.
Notwithstanding, from the point of view of the reasoning process, to dis-
pense with the existential import is not easy as many of the valid syllogisms
use it. For instance, for those syllogistic models that entails arithmetic (such
as Exceptive, Fuzzy or Interval Syllogistics), existential import allows us to
avoid those undefinitions that can appear in the conclusion by 0 at the de-
nominator; those based on the LSO, there are several syllogistic models that
cannot be proved; e.g., “all DT are MT, all NT are DT; therefore, some NT are
MT”.
Thus, we propose to introduce the existential import as an explicit assump-
tion when it is necessary. Then, any syllogism must include as additional ex-
plicit presupposition a statement that says that all the subject-terms of the
premises are non-empty sets; for instance, “no consulting detective is Span-
ish; there is at least one consulting detective”. For everyday reasoning, this
is not so strange as human beings perform a lot of additional assumptions or
presuppositions. Existential import is only one more that should be explicitly
uttered to avoid misunderstanding, as it is not always assumed by anybody.
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2.1.2 Singular Statements
A syllogism, in its standard definition as we said, only deals with categorical
statements with the form Q S are P. However, there are other type of state-
ments, such as “Socrates is a human being”, where the subject-term is an in-
dividual instead of a set or a category. These are the so-called singular state-
ments [2]. They are very common in natural language and in everyday reason-
ing. For instance, let us consider the syllogism of Table 6, where the second
premise is a singular statement. If we apply the standard definition of syllo-
gism, it is not an example one; however, anybody accept its validity and it also
involves quantified statements (the first premise).
All human beings are mortal
Socrates is a human being
Socrates is mortal
Table 6: Syllogism involving a singular statement.
This question can be easily addressed using the concept of singleton; i.e.,
a set with exactly one element. Thus, any singular statement denotes a sin-
gle element in the subject-term; i.e., “Socrates” denotes the set {Socrates},
whose unique element is the historical personage Socrates. This leads us to
consider the proper name Socrates as a defined description [25]. Therefore, any
singular statement that appears in a syllogism involving singular statements
can be transformed into a categorical one transforming the defined descrip-
tion into a quantified formula with “all”; i.e., “Socrates ≡ all Socrates”.
2.1.3 Non-Proportional Statements
As we show, the Aristotelian and most of the current approaches to syllogistic
reasoning only considers, in general, proportional quantifiers, such as “all”,
“few”, “most”, “many”, etc. However, we manage in natural language many
more (for instance, “all but three”, “double”, “half”, “twenty-five”, etc.) that
are not usually considered in syllogistic models.
The typical fuzzy classification of quantifiers [26] only considers two types
of binary quantifiers: absolute ones (such as “four”, “around twenty-five”, etc.)
and proportional ones (i.e., “few”, “most”, “many”, etc.). Nevertheless, the cur-
rent linguistic theory of quantification, the Theory of Generalized Quantifiers
(TGQ) [23] distinguishes many more types of quantifiers, as we pointed out. In
addition of the absolute and proportional types, there are others, such as the
pointed out exception ones (i.e., “all but three”, “all but around five”, etc.) or
the comparative ones (i.e., “double”, “half”, etc.). Thus, from our point of view,
any further improvement in the modelling of syllogistic reasoning should in-
clude these types of quantifiers.
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TGQ defines the quantification phenomenon in terms of relationships be-
tween sets. This means that TGQ and set-based interpretation are fully com-
patible, which provide us a framework for dealing with non-proportional quan-
tifiers. The standard notation for Venn Diarams is not enough for dealing with
this type of statements, but using set-theory notation, it is not difficult. For
instance, let us consider an universe E and the exception statement “All but
three Y1 are Y2”; for Y1, Y2 ∈ P(E):
All but three : P(E)× P(E) → {0, 1}
(Y1, Y2) → All but three(Y1, Y2) =
{
0 : if |Y1 ∩ Y2| 6= 3
1 : if |Y1 ∩ Y2| = 3
In [10], this approach is criticised as it entails to apply high order logic. As
it is known, high order logics are not completely decidable and, then, there
are propositions that cannot be proved or rejected. However, there are many
statements that are decidable and, very likely, the formalization of most of
quantified statements that we use in our daily life belong to this class. Thus,
we consider that the compatibility with TGQ is meaningfully step in the im-
provement of syllogistic reasoning.
3 Conditional Interpretation: Models and Questions
Conditional interpretation, as we said, assumes that syllogistic statements
have a conditional deep form with the following equivalence, “if x is S, then x
is P with link Q between them”, where S is the subject-term, P the predicate-
term and Q the indicates how strong is the link between S and P. In this case,
it is relevant to note that propositions do not involve sets or relationships be-
tween sets but individuals and properties in an unconditional universe. For
instance, the statement “all human beings are mortal” means that any ele-
ment x in the universe U , if x has the property of being a human being, then
x has the property of being a mortal being with a very strong degree of con-
nection denoted by “all”. If the quantifier is other (non-universal), such as
“almost all”, “few”, etc. this degree is going weaker.
In probability terms, this interpretation is closer to think probability as re-
porting our subjective degrees of belief about a fact or an event. This is the
view expressed by Thomas Bayes and P. S. Laplace [21]. Thus, under this per-
spective, reasoning process can be viewed as an heuristic process where a sub-
ject calculate the probability of the conclusion according to the probabilities
expressed in the premises.
There are different proposals for modelling the strength of the conditional
( [10, 11, 27]), but in this paper we only focus on the so-called Probabilistic
Syllogistics [10], as we think that is is the most relevant one.
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Probabilistic Syllogistics is developed into the field of psychology of rea-
soning and it focus on analysing how human beings reason rather than which
are the rules of the right reasoning [10], which reinforces the subjective inter-
pretation of probability. The main thesis of the authors is that human mind is
probabilistic; therefore, quantifiers are a linguistic way for expressing proba-
bilities. For instance, “most S are P” means 1−  ≤ P (P |S) < 1,  > 0, where 
is small as it represents the meaning of “few”, the antonym of “most”. Table 7
shows the probabilistic notation of the four Aristotelian quantifiers, “most”
and “few”.
Linguistic Expression Probabilistic Expression
All S are P P (P |S) = 1
No S are P P (P |S) = 0
Some S are P P (P |S) > 0 and S are not empty
Some S are not P P (P |S) < 1 and S are not empty
Most S are P 1−  ≤ P (P |S) < 1,  > 0
Few S are P 0 < P (P |S) ≤ ,  > 0
Table 7: Probabilistic expression of “all”, “none”, “some”, “some...not”, “few”
and “most”.
Regarding inference, the rules that work in this model are heuristic rather
than deductive, as they are focused on searching the most plausible solution,
putting the logical validity of the argument in a side place. Let us consider
the example shown in Table 8. The premises are organized according to their
quantifiers; i.e., from the universal one (all-premises) in the first premise to
existential one in the second one (some-premises). With respect to the con-
clusion, two of the heuristic rules appears [10, p. 217-219]:
• min-heuristic rule: it indicates that there is a tendency towards select-
ing the quantifier of the least informative premise (some and some...not-
premises.).
• attachment-heuristic rule: it indicates that there is a tendency towards
selecting the subject of one of the premises as the subject of the conclu-
sion.
It is clear that this way for interpreting syllogisms is also deductive, but it
does no have the probative character of the set-based models as this focuses
on finding a quick (although seemingly right) answer.
3.1 Some Open Questions
Next, we shall consider the three same questions analysed in section 2.1: i)
the existential import, ii) singular statements and iii) non-proportional quan-
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Syllogism Heuristic
All students are tall max-premise
Some young people are students min-premise
Some-type conclusion by min-heuristic
Some young people are students by attachment-heuristic
Table 8: Inference schema of syllogism AII (Figure I) under a probabilistic ap-
proach.
tifiers.
3.1.1 Existential Import
As can be observed at Table 7, existential import only appears in “some” and
“some...not” statements; the remaining ones, universal, “most” and “few” do
not include it. In this case, given there is not LSO there is not any problem
with subalternation problem. On the other hand, this approach follows the
same idea of the modern LSO described in Figure 3.
As we explained in section 3, it is assumed that these statements deal with
individuals and properties. Therefore, the concept of empty set has no place
here; a concrete individual can have a property or not and this determine the
truth value of the corresponding part of the conditional. For instance, if we
use the material conditional, “if x is a Martian, then x is blond with maximum
strength in the connection” is vacuously true because no x has the the prop-
erty of being a Martian. From the point of view of the heuristic rules defined
by Probabilistic Syllogistics, the existential import does not have any impact
as there are neither rules about subalternation not moods analogous to the
Aristotelian ones.
3.1.2 Singular Statements
In the conditional interpretation, it is not a clear definition for singular state-
ments in terms of probability. For instance, let us consider the proposition
“Socrates is mortal”. We can consider its conditional definition in terms of
“if x is Socrates, then x is mortal”. However, which is the quantifier that de-
fines the strength of the link between the antecedent and the consequent? If
Socrates is a property, it cannot be a quantifier.
A possible solution is to assume that the predication of the property Socrates
entails the existential quantifier; i.e., “Socrates is mortal” is equivalent to “if
x is Socrates, then x is mortal and there is an x that is Socrates”. However, as
it was explained in Table 7, “some” quantifier does not denote a strong quan-
tifier between antecedent and consequent which seems counterintuitive with
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respect to this case, where only a single element has the property of being
Socrates. On the other hand, this lead us to the problem of the existential
import. For instance, let us consider the following statement “the present
king of France is bold”. We know that France is a republic and it dos not have
king, then, the predicate term of this statement has no reference. Thus, is
this proposition true or false? This is a debatable question in philosophy of
language.
An alternative possibility is explaining singular statements using proba-
bilistic terms. These can be interpreted as evidences [21], new pieces of infor-
mation that allows us to update our beliefs and, therefore, accepted as true in
the model. This updating process is can bee seen as the equivalent to reason-
ing, and the usual form for expressing it is trough Modus Pones; i.e., “if A is B,x
is A then x is B”. However, in this type of arguments, the role of the quantifier,
as a linguistic particle for denoting quantity, is hidden.
3.1.3 Non-proportional quantifiers
This question was explicitly addressed in [10]. The authors defend that this
question is not relevant enough. The use of precise absolute quantifiers is very
reduced in our daily life as they only appear in very specific contexts. In these
cases, precise assertions can be interpreted in terms of proportional ones if
the size of the cardinality of the subject-term is known or directly estimated.
On the other hand, the role of the TGQ for dealing with a reasoning model
also was questioned. It is based on a second order logic and this type of logics,
in general, is not completely decidable and, therefore, there are propositions
that cannot be proved or rejected. There is an exception with monadic second-
order logic, which is decidable but it can only express propositions composed
by a single argument such as “Socrates is mortal”. However, most of the quan-
tified statements managed by human being are binary (i.e., “few students are
tall”) and some of them cannot be decidable. Lastly, conditional interpreta-
tion is better supported by psychological experiments than set-based inter-
pretation. Therefore, other quantifiers that appear in natural language such
as the absolute or exception ones are not relevant for this model of syllogism.
Notwithstanding, this is not a minor question from our point of view whether
a computational perspective is adopted. In [28], the compatibility between set-
based interpretation and TGQ was proved. TGQ is not only a logical theory but
a linguistic one; currently, it is the prevailing theory of quantification in nat-
ural language.
On the other hand, the use of non-proportional quantifiers can be relevant
in many contexts where the everyday reasoning is not applied but natural lan-
guage is used, such as diagnostic system. Therefore, for a further improvement
of syllogistic reasoning, this type of quantifiers must not be dismissed.
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4 Conclusions
We have presented two alternative interpretations for quantified statements
in syllogisms: one based on the management of sets and the other on individ-
uals and properties involved in conditional statements. This entails not only
a change in the knowledge representation (from sets of elements to assign-
ing properties to individuals) but also in the reasoning process (from one that
tries to prove without doubt to other that tries to obtain quick answers).
Three relevant questions of syllogistic reasoning have been analysed (ex-
istential import, singular statements and non-proportional quantifiers) and
how they can be addressed from both models. We conclude that set-based in-
terpretation shows, in general, a better behaviour for a further development
of syllogistic reasoning. In the vein of improving the expressiveness capabil-
ity of syllogistic models, the analysis of non-proportional quantifiers is more
relevant than the other two questions, as it allows us to deal with many of the
quantifiers defined by TGQ. In this way, many other arguments of everyday
reasoning can be addressed using a logical model.
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